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Abstract. Analogy-making is an essential part of human intelligence
and creativity. This paper proposes an algebraic model of analogical rea-
soning in logic programming based on the syntactic composition and
decomposition of programs. The main idea is to define analogy in terms
of modularity and to derive abstract forms of concrete programs from a
‘known’ source domain which can then be instantiated in an ‘unknown’
target domain to obtain analogous programs. To this end, we introduce
algebraic operations for program modularity and illustrate, by giving
numerous examples, that programs have nice decompositions. Interest-
ingly, our work suggests a close relationship between modularity, gen-
eralization, and analogy which we believe should be explored further in
the future. In a broader sense, this paper is a first step towards an alge-
braic (and mainly syntactic) theory of analogical reasoning in logic-based
knowledge representation and reasoning systems, with potential applica-
tions to fundamental AI-problems like computational learning and cre-
ativity.
Keywords: Artificial General Intelligence · Knowledge Transfer · Com-
putational Learning.
1 Introduction
Analogy-making is an essential part of human intelligence and creativity, with
applications to such diverse tasks as commonsense reasoning, problem solving,
and story telling (cf. [12,7]).
This paper proposes an algebraic model of analogical reasoning in logic pro-
gramming based on the syntactic composition and decomposition of programs.
The main idea is to define analogy in terms of modularity and to derive abstract
forms of concrete programs from a ‘known’ source domain which can then be
instantiated in a ‘novel’ target domain to obtain analogous programs. To this
end, we introduce algebraic operations for program modularity and illustrate,
by giving numerous examples, that programs have nice decompositions.
In general, ‘creative’ analogies contain some form of unexpectedness, in the
sense that objects (possibly from different domains) are put together in a novel
and often unforeseen way. Consider the following running example.
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Example 1. Imagine two domains, one consisting of numerals of the form 0, s(0),
s(s(0)), . . ., formally representing the natural numbers, and the other made up
of lists [ ], [a], [a, [b]], and so on. We know from basic arithmetic what it means
to add two numbers (i.e., numerals), e.g., plus(s(0), s(0), s(s(0))) expresses the
fact that one plus one equals two. Now suppose we want to transfer the concept
of addition to the list domain. We can then ask—by analogy—the following
question: What does it mean to ‘add’ two lists? There are (at least) two possible
answers: One is to say that a list ℓ, say, is the ‘addition’ of two lists ℓ1 and ℓ2,
say, if the number of elements in ℓ equals the sum of the number of elements
in ℓ1 and ℓ2. In this case, we do not take the inner structure
1 of lists into
account and we directly transfer the concept of number to lists, e.g., in analogy
to plus(s(0), s(0), s(s(0))), the fact plus([a], [b], [c, c]) is perfectly derivable under
this interpretation. However, if we do respect the inner structure of lists, we
obtain a second interpretation in which ℓ is the ‘addition’ of ℓ1 and ℓ2 if ℓ is
the list ℓ1 appended by ℓ2. In this case, we have specialized the analogy to the
concrete domain at hand.2 This simple example shows the inexact nature of
analogies.
We can now ask a further question: Given that we ‘know’ how to add num-
bers, can we use this knowledge to answer questions in the list domain? It is
evident that in the first case, where we only cared about the number of elements
in a list, we can simulate ‘addition’ of lists via addition of numerals. The more
interesting case is the second one, that is, given that multiple lists have the same
length and thus map to the same numeral, can we still ‘add’ (i.e., append) lists
via the (seemingly) simpler addition of numerals?3 Surprisingly, the answer is
again ‘yes’, and we will return to this question, in a more formal way, in Example
4 and 8 (in which we also discuss the important role of (un)typing for analogical
reasoning).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section is preliminary
and recalls the syntax and proof theory of an untyped version of higher-order
Horn logic programming. Section 3 introduces two algebraic operations for pro-
gram modularity, namely ‘composition’ and ‘concatenation’, on which the no-
tions of analogy and logic program forms will be based. The following Sections
4 and 5 constitute the main part of the paper. In Section 4 we define the notion
of analogy and show how analogies can be used to transfer knowledge across
different domains by formally and precisely discussing Example 1. After that we
introduce in Section 5 the notion of logic program form and show that forms
subsume analogies. We then sketch, by giving detailed examples, a procedure for
analogical reasoning via decomposition, abstraction, and specialization. Finally,
we conclude the paper with a discussion and some ideas for future research.
1 One can distinguish between different elements of a list.
2 Note that we still have the property that the length of the list ℓ is the sum of the
lengths of ℓ1 and ℓ2.
3 What we mean here is a simple mapping between lists and numerals which makes
no use of any complicated form of encoding.
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For excellent surveys on computational models of analogical reasoning we
refer the reader to [8,15,16].
2 Preliminaries
We recall the syntax and proof theory of higher-order Horn logic programs where
we restrict ourselves to the untyped case.
2.1 Syntax
Let Σ be an unranked nonempty alphabet whose elements are called symbols.
Terms are formed as usual from variables x, y, z, . . . and symbols from Σ, where
constants are treated as 0-ary symbols. A term is ground if it contains no vari-
ables. The set of ground terms is called the Herbrand universe of Σ and is
denoted by HUΣ.
An (untyped higher-order Horn logic) program over Σ (or Σ-program) is a set
of rules of the form
t0 ←− t1, . . . , tk, k ≥ 0, (1)
where t0, . . . , tk are terms. A program is called ground if each of its rule is ground.
It will be convenient to define, for a rule r of the form (1), H(r) = {t0} (head)
and B(r) = {t1, . . . , tk} (body) extended to programs by H(P ) =
⋃
r∈P
H(r)
and B(P ) =
⋃
r∈P
B(r). A fact is a rule with empty body, whereas a proper
rule is a rule which is not a fact. We denote the facts (resp., proper rules) of P
by P ∅ (resp., P¶). We will occasionally make some of the variables occurring
in a program P explicit by writing, e.g., P (x, y) for the program containing the
variables x, y.
Substitutions and unifiers are defined as usual and we denote the most general
unifier of two terms s, t by mgu(s, t). Substitutions operate on expressions as
usual and we denote the application of a substitution θ on an expression E by
E[θ].
For a symbol q ∈ Σ and a rule r of the form (1), we define the wrapping of
r via q by
q(r) = q(t0)←− q(t1), . . . , q(tk),
extended to programs by q(P ) = {q(r) | r ∈ P}. The reverse of a program P is
obtained by reversing all the arrows in P , that is,
−→
P = {t←− H(r) | r ∈ P : t ∈ B(r)}.
A multiset S of rules is a submultiset of P , denoted S ⊑ P , if S consists only of
rules from P .
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2.2 SLD-Resolution
Logic programs compute via a restricted form of resolution, called SLD-resolution,
as follows.
For simplicity, we consider here only the ground case. Let Q be a ground
query ←− t1, . . . , tk, k ≥ 1, and suppose that for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k and m ≥ 0,
r = ti ←− t
′
1, . . . , t
′
m
is a rule from gnd(P ). Then Q′ given by
←− t1, . . . , ti−1, t
′
1, . . . , t
′
m
, ti+1, . . . , tk
is called a resolvent of Q and r, and ti is called the selected term of Q. By
iterating this process we obtain a sequence of resolvents which is called an SLD-
derivation. A derivation can be finite or infinite. If its last query is empty then
we speak of an SLD-refutation of the original query Q. In this case we have
derived an SLD-proof of t1, . . . , tk. A failed SLD-derivation is a finite derivation
which is not a refutation. In case t is a ground term with an SLD-proof from P ,
we say that t is an SLD-consequence of P and write P ⊢ t. Given two programs
P,R we say that P is SLD-equivalent to R if P ⊢ t implies R ⊢ t and vice versa,
for all ground terms t. For a rule r of the form (1), we write P ⊢ r in case P ⊢ t0
whenever P ⊢ ti holds for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We denote the empty query by .
A type program for Σ (or Σ-type program) is a program π which ‘generates’
the Herbrand universe of Σ in the sense that any ground term t is in HUΣ if,
and only if, π ⊢ t.
Example 2. In this paper, we will be interested in three basic data structures:
numerals, lists, and (binary) trees. The corresponding type programs are con-
structed as follows. Let Nat = {0/0, s/1}, List = {nil/0, cons/2}, and Tree =
{0/0, f/3} be alphabets. As is customary in logic programming, we abbrevi-
ate lists by writing, e.g., [a, b] instead of cons(a, cons(b, nil)) and so on. Then,
we define the Nat-, List-, and Tree-type programs ω(x), λ(u, x), and τ(u, x, y),
respectively, by
0←− [ ]←− 0←−
s(x)←− x, [u | x]←− x, f(u, x, y)←− x, y.
3 Modularity
In the rest of the paper, P and R will denote logic programs over some
common alphabet Σ if not specified otherwise.
This section introduces two (syntactic) composition operations on which we
will base our notions of analogy and logic program forms.
Definition 1. We define the composition of P and R by
P ◦R = {H(rθ)←− B(Sθ) | r ∈ P, S ⊑ R : H(Sθ) = B(rθ), θ = mgu(B(r), H(S))}.
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In the sequel, we simply write PR if the composition operation is understood.
We denote the neutral element with respect to composition by 1.
Roughly, we obtain the composition of P and R by resolving all body atoms
in P with the ‘matching’ rule heads of R. Composition is thus related to SLD-
resolution in the sense that we can answer queries across different domains via
decomposition (cf. Example 4).
Example 3. Reconsider the program ω of Example 2 generating the natural num-
bers. By composing the only proper rule in ω with itself, we obtain
(ω¶)2 = {s(x)←− x} ◦ {s(x)←− x} = {s(s(x))←− x}.
Note that this program, together with the single fact in ω, generates the even
numbers. Let us therefore define the program
ε = ω∅ ∪ (ω¶)2 =
{
0←−
s(s(x)) ←− x
}
. (2)
We will come back to this example in (Section 5) when studying logic program
forms.
In some cases, a program is the ‘concatenation’ of two other programs on an
atomic level. A typical example is the program
Length =


length([ ], 0)←−
length([u | x], s(y))←−
length(x, y)


which is, roughly, the ‘concatenation’ of the List-type program λ(u, x) in the
first argument and the Nat-type program ω(y) in the second argument wrapped
by the symbol length (cf. Example 2). This is formalized as follows.
Definition 2. We define the concatenation of P and R inductively as follows:
1. For symbols p, q and sequences of terms s, t,
p(s) · q(t) =
{
p(s, t) if p = q,
undefined otherwise.
2. For rules r, r′,
r · r′ = (H(r) ·H(r′))←− {t · t′ | t ∈ B(r), t′ ∈ B(r′)}.
3. Finally, the concatenation of P and R is given by
P · R = {r · r′ | r ∈ P, r′ ∈ R}.
We can now formally decompose the program Length from above with re-
spect to concatenation by
Length = length(λ(u, x)) · length(ω(y)).
We will return to decompositions of this form in Section 5.
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4 Analogy
In this section, we formalize the concept of two programs, possibly from different
domains, being syntactically analogous (or similar).
Definition 3. We say that P can be (one-step) simulated by R, in symbols
P . R, if there are programs X,Y over ΣP ∪ ΣR such that P = XRY . In this
case, we call the programs X,Y the left and right transfer programs, respectively.
If P . R and R . P , we say that P and R are analogous (or similar) and write
P ≈ R.
In other words, P can be simulated by R if there is a decomposition of P
(over the joint alphabet ΣP ∪ΣR) in which R occurs as a factor, that is, if P can
be algebraically constructed from R. The intuition is that the transfer programs
X,Y in the decomposition of P function as ‘bridges’ for transferring information
between P and R, as is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4. To return to our introductory Example 1, consider the well-known
program
Plus =


plus(0, y, y)←−
plus(s(x), y, s(z))←−
plus(x, y, z)

 ,
implementing the addition of positive numbers (represented as numerals). We
can now ask—by analogy—what it means to ‘add’ two lists. As we have informally
discussed in Example 1, there are at least two possible answers. The first is to
say that a list ℓ, say, is the ‘addition’ of the lists ℓ1, ℓ2, say, if the number of
elements of ℓ equals the sum of the number of elements in ℓ1 and ℓ2. This solution
is represented by the program
PlusList =


plus([ ], [ ], [ ])←−
plus([ ], [u | y], [v | z])←−
plus([ ], y, z)
plus([u | x], y, [v | z])←−
plus(x, y, z)


.
Note that the program PlusList does not take the inner structure of lists into
account; e.g., we can derive
PlusList ⊢ plus([a], [a], [b, [b]]).
The program PlusList is arguably the ‘freest’ translation of Plus into the list
domain in the sense that for any rule r consisting only of shared symbols (e.g.,
plus), we have
PlusList ⊢ r ⇐⇒ Plus ⊢ r. (3)
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For example, the rule
r = plus(y, x, z)←− plus(x, y, z),
expressing commutativity of addition, is derivable from both programs. However,
if we do take the inner structure of lists into account, we obtain a second solution
where ℓ is the ‘addition’ of ℓ1 and ℓ2 if ℓ is ℓ1 appended by ℓ2. This case is
represented by the program
Append =


plus([ ], y, y)←−
plus([u | x], y, [v | z])←−
plus(x, y, z)

 .
In a sense, we can say that Append is a specialization of PlusList to the concrete
list domain. As a consequence, Append does not satisfy (3).
We now want to show that all of the three programs in this example are
analogous according to Definition 3. We first show that Plus and Append are
analogous. For this, we define the transfer program X1 by
X1 =


plus(0, y, y)←−
plus([ ], y, y)
plus(s(x), y, s(z))←−
plus([u | x], y, [v | z])


and compute
Plus = X1 ◦Append and Append =
−→
X 1 ◦ Plus.
We now show that Plus and PlusList are analogous by defining the transfer
program
X2 =


plus(0, y, y)←−
plus([ ], [ ], [ ])
plus(s(x), y, s(z))←−
plus([ ], [u | y], [u | z])
plus(s(x), y, s(z))←−
plus([u | x], y, [u | z]).


and by computing
Plus = X1 ◦ PlusList and PlusList = X2 ◦ Plus.
This shows
Plus ≈ PlusList ≈ Append.
Finally, we want to mention that there are many other (list) programs analogous
to Plus (with different ‘bridges’, of course), which shows the inexact nature of
analogy (see the discussion in Section 7).
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The following SLD-derivation demonstrates how we can use the transfer pro-
gram X1 from above to append two lists via the seemingly simpler program for
the addition of numerals:
?
←− plus([a], [b, c], [a, b, c])
−→
X1←−− plus(s([ ]), [b, c], s([b, c]))
Plus
←−−− plus([ ], [b, c], [b, c])
−→
X1←−− plus(0, [b, c], [b, c])
Plus
←−−− .
This shows, via a translation to numerals,
Append ⊢ plus([a], [b, c], [a, b, c]).
Interestingly, the SLD-derivation above contains the ‘entangled’ terms s([ ]) and
s([a, b]) which are neither numerals nor lists, and we believe that such ‘dual’ syn-
tactic objects—which under the conventional doctrine of programming are not
well-typed—are characteristic for analogical reasoning across different domains
and deserve special attention (this is discussed in Section 7).
The programs in Example 4 are syntactically almost identical. We now give
an example in which the programs differ more substantially.
Example 5. In [18] the authors derive a mapping between the program Append
from Example 4 above and the program
Member =


member(u, [u | x])←−
member(u, [v | x])←−
member(u, x)

 ,
which computes list membership. We can now ask—by analogy to [18]—whether
Member can be simulated by Append (and vice versa) according to our defini-
tion. Define the transfer programs
W =
{
member(u, [u | x])←−
member(u, [v | x])←− plus([v | x], u, [v | x])
}
and
Z = {plus(x, y, z)←− member(y, x)}.
It is not hard to compute
Member =W ◦Append ◦ Z,
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which shows that membership can indeed be simulated by the program for ap-
pending lists, i.e.,
Member . Append. (4)
Interestingly enough, the transfer programs W,Z, which in combination per-
mute the first two arguments of Append and ‘forget’ about the last one, resem-
ble the mapping computed in [18] by other means. The converse of (4) fails,
roughly, since Member does not contain enough ‘syntactic structure’ to simu-
late Append. The intuitive reason is that member is a binary predicate, whereas
plus is ternary.
The following simple example shows that analogy and (logical) equivalence
are ‘orthogonal’ concepts.
Example 6. The empty program is equivalent to the propositional program a←−
a consisting of a single rule. Since we cannot obtain the rule a ←− a from the
empty program via composition, equivalence does not imply analogy. For the
other direction, a simple computation shows that the programs P = {a, b←− a}
and R = {a, b←− a, b} are analogous; however, P and R are not SLD-equivalent.
5 Logic Program Forms
In this section, we study the process of deriving abstract forms of concrete pro-
grams from a ‘known’ source domain which can then be instantiated in a ‘novel’
target domain to obtain analogous programs.
We are now ready to introduce the main notion of the paper.
Definition 4. A (logic program) form is any well-formed expression containing
programs, program variables, and the composition operations introduced above.
Formally, a form is defined by the grammar
ϕ ::= ϕ ∪ ϕ | ϕ ◦ ϕ | ϕ · ϕ | ϕ∅ | ϕ¶ | ϕ[θ] | q(ϕ) | P | X
where θ is a substitution, q ∈ Σ is a symbol, P is a program, and X is a program
variable.
We will usually write forms in boldface to distinguish them from ordinary pro-
grams.
Logic program forms induce transformations of programs in the obvious way
by replacing program variables with concrete programs. A particularly interest-
ing form, derived from the definition of simulation, is given, for any program P ,
by
Sim〈P 〉(X,Y) = X ◦ P ◦ Y.
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Of course, we can now reformulate 3 by saying that P is simulated by R if, and
only if, there are some transfer programs X,Y such that P = Sim〈R〉(X,Y ).
For instance, we can reformulate the program Append from Example 4 as
Append = Sim〈Plus〉(
−→
X1, 1).
This shows that program forms subsume the concepts of simulation and analogy.
Forms are strictly ‘more expressive’ than analogies in the sense that two pro-
grams may share some abstract property and still not be analogous according
to 3. More precisely, for any form ϕ and programs P,R we can say that ϕ(P )
and ϕ(R) share the abstract property expressed by ϕ; however, in general, we
cannot expect ϕ(P ) and ϕ(R) to be analogous. This shows that program forms
can capture, in a functorial way, abstract similarities which are ‘invisible’ under
the lens of analogy.
Example 7. In Example 3 we have constructed the program ε, representing the
even numbers, from ω by inheriting its fact and by iterating its proper rule once.
By replacing ω in (2) with a program variable X, we arrive at the form
Even(X) = X∅ ∪ (X¶)2. (5)
We can now instantiate this form with arbitrary programs to transfer the concept
of being ‘even’ to other domains. For example, consider the program
Reverse =


reverse([ ], [ ])←−
reverse([u | x], y)←−
reverse(x, z),
plus(z, [u], y)

 ∪Append
for reversing lists.4 By instantiating the form (5) with Reverse, we obtain the
program Even(Reverse) given by
reverse([ ], [ ])←−
reverse([u1, u2 | x], [u3 | y])←−
reverse(x, z),
plus(z, [u2], [u3 | w]),
plus(w, [u1], y)
plus([ ], y, y)←−
plus([u1, u2 | x], y, [u1, u2 | z])←−
plus(x, y, z).
One can verify that Even(Reverse) is a program for reversing lists of even
length. Similarly, if Sort is a program for sorting lists, then Even(Sort) is a
program for sorting ‘even’ lists and so on.
4 Recall from Example 4 that Append uses the predicate (i.e., symbol) plus instead of
append.
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We now come back to Example 4 from the perspective of logic program forms.
Example 8. Reconsider the program Plus of Example 4 given by
Plus =


plus(0, y, y)←−
plus(s(x), y, s(z))←−
plus(x, y, z)

 .
We now want to derive a form Plus from Plus which abstractly represents
addition. Our first observation is that Plus is, essentially, the concatenation of
ω in the first and last parameter together with a middle part. Formally, we can
deconcatenate Plus by
Plus = plus(ω(x)) ·


plus(y, y)←−
plus(y)←−
plus(y)

 ·
{
plus←−
plus(ω(z))¶
}
.
By generalizing the two instances of ω in the above expression, we immediately
obtain the form Plus(X,Y) given by
plus(X) ·


plus(y, y)←−
plus(y)←−
plus(y)

 ·
{
plus←−
plus(Y)¶
}
.
We can now instantiate this form to obtain analogous programs for addition.
For instance, we can derive the program Append of Example 4 by instantiating
the form with the List-type program λ of Example 2 as follows:
Append = Plus(λ(u, x), λ(u, z)).
As a further example, we want to define the ‘addition’ of (binary) trees by
instantiating the form Plus with the Tree-type program τ . Note that we now
have multiple choices:
1. As in the case of lists, we can choose to ‘bind’ the variables u and v.
2. Additionally, since τ(u, x, y) contains two bound variables (i.e, x, y), we have
four more possibilities.
Let us first consider the program
Plus(τ(u, x, x), τ(u, z, z)) (6)
given by
plus(0, y, y)←−
plus(f(u, x, x), y, f(u, z, z))←−
plus(x, y, z).
This program ‘appends’ the tree in the second argument to each leaf of the
symmetric tree in the first argument.
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Note that all of the above programs are syntactically almost identical, e.g.,
we can transform Plus into Append via a simple rewriting of terms. The next
program shows that we can derive programs from Plus which syntactically differ
more substantially from the above programs. Concretely, the program
Plus(τ(u, x1, x2), τ(u, z1, z2))
given by
plus(0, y, y)←−
plus(f(u, x1, x2), y, f(u, z1, z2))←−
plus(x1, y, z1),
plus(x2, y, z1),
plus(x1, y, z2),
plus(x2, y, z2).
is SLD-equivalent to program (6). However, in some situations, this more com-
plicated representation is beneficial. For example, we can now remove the second
and third body term to obtain the more compact program
plus(0, y, y)←−
plus(f(u, x1, x2), y, f(u, z1, z2))←−
plus(x1, y, z1),
plus(x2, y, z2).
This program, in analogy to program (6), ‘appends’ the tree in the second ar-
gument to each leaf of the not necessarily symmetric tree in the first argument
and thus generalizes (6).
The above examples motivate the following Procedure A for the transfer
of knowledge from a ‘known’ source domain S to a ‘novel’ target domain T via
logic program forms:
1. Decompose the source program S ∈ S into factors S1, . . . , Sn ∈ S, n ≥ 1.
2. Replace the programs S1, . . . , Sn in the decomposition of S by program vari-
ables X1, . . . ,Xn to obtain the form S(X1, . . . ,Xn).
3. Instantiate the form S with ‘known’ programs P1, . . . , Pn ∈ T from the target
domain to obtain the target program P = S(P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ T.
4. If necessary, specialize the program P—given some further information on
the specification of the intended program—to the concrete domain at hand.
Of course, each step of Procedure A is, in its current form, vague and we
leave its formalization as a starting point for future research.
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6 Related Work
Arguably, the most prominent (symbolic) model of analogical reasoning to date
is Gentner’s Structure-Mapping Theory (or SMT) [6], first implemented in [5].
Our approach shares with Gentner’s SMT its symbolic and syntactic nature.
However, while in SMT mappings are constructed with respect to meta-logical
considerations—for instance, Gentner’s systematicity principle prefers connected
knowledge over independent facts—in our framework mappings are realized as
(transfer) programs satisfying mathematically well-defined properties.
Some work has been done on analogical reasoning in the setting of logic
programming. Most notably are the early works of [9,10,11], which implement
Winston’s principle (cf. [19]):
Assume that the premises t1, . . . , tk logically imply t0 in the source do-
main and that the analogous premises t′1, . . . , t
′
k
hold in the target do-
main. Then we can conclude t′0 in the target domain which is analogous
to t0.
In practice, the main difficulty for implementing this principle is the detection of
two syntactic objects being analogous. In our framework, the analogical mapping
between ‘similar’ logical atoms is implicitly established in the computation of
transfer programs, thus respecting the syntactic structure of the encapsulating
programs.
Finally, we briefly want to mention the works of [4], [3], and [18], dealing
with analogical reasoning in logic programming, and the works of [17,13] which
study the nonmonotonic aspects of analogies.
7 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed an algebraic model of analogical reasoning in logic
programming. More precisely, we introduced algebraic operations for program
modularity and defined the notions of analogy and logic program forms in terms
of syntactic decompositions of programs.
In general, ‘creative’ analogies contain some form of unexpectedness, in the
sense that objects (possibly from different domains) are put together in a novel
and often unforeseen way. For instance, in Example 4 we have—directly—used
the (seemingly) simpler program for addition of numbers in the list domain for
appending lists, where ‘entangled’ terms of the form s([ ]) and s([a, b]), which
are neither numerals nor lists, occurred. We believe that ‘dual’ syntactic objects
of this form—which under the conventional doctrine of programming are not
well-typed (see, for example, the remarks in [1, §5.8.2])—are characteristic for
‘creative’ analogies across different domains and deserve special attention. More
precisely, if we think of (logic) programs as ‘tools’ for solving problems, then
using those tools ‘creatively’ often requires, as in the example mentioned above, a
tight coupling between seemingly incompatible objects. However, if those objects
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are statically typed by the programmer, then this might prevent the creation and
exploitation of useful analogical ‘bridges’ for knowledge transfer.
In a broader sense, this paper is a first step towards an algebraic (and mainly
syntactic) theory of analogical reasoning in logic-based knowledge representation
and reasoning systems, with potential applications to fundamental AI-problems
like computational learning and creativity.
7.1 Outlook
A major task is to formalize each step of Procedure A (cf. Section 5):
1. What are the considerations when systematically computing decompositions
of S and under which conditions do (unique) ‘prime’ decompositions exist?
2. Which factors in the decomposition of S should be replaced by program
variables? (For instance, in Example 8, when computing the form Plus(X,Y)
we have not replaced the middle factor dealing with the variable y by a
program variable).
3. How can we systematically choose the right programs P1, . . . , Pn in the target
domain to obtain the intended target program P? (For instance, in Example
8, it does not make much sense to substitute the program Plus into the form
Plus).
4. How can we systematically incorporate additional information for the spec-
ification of the target program (e.g., in the form of positive and negative
examples) into our framework?
For practical concerns, efficient implementations of Procedure A are of
interest. From a theoretical point of view, a mathematical study of (the rela-
tionship between) modularity, analogy, and logic program forms is desirable.
Analogical proportions are statements of the form ‘a is to b as c is to d’ and are
another form of analogical reasoning. It is interesting to incorporate analogical
proportions into our framework by using the algebraic operations introduced in
this paper.
Another interesting line of research is to recast the ideas in this paper to
nonmonotonic logic programming under the answer set semantics (cf. [2]). This
task is non-trivial due to negation as failure occurring in rule bodies (and heads),
and we want to mention that some work has already been done in this direction
(cf. [17,13,14]).
Finally, motivated by the discussion above, we believe that it is interesting
to investigate the role of (polymorphic) (un)typing in computational models of
analogy-making for computational learning and creativity.
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